Airlines, Defibrillators, and Enhanced Medical Kits: Filling a Void or Creating a Duty by Buffington, Julie A.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 64 | Issue 2 Article 7
1998
Airlines, Defibrillators, and Enhanced Medical Kits:
Filling a Void or Creating a Duty
Julie A. Buffington
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julie A. Buffington, Airlines, Defibrillators, and Enhanced Medical Kits: Filling a Void or Creating a Duty, 64 J. Air L. & Com. 497 (1998)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol64/iss2/7
AIRLINES, DEF[BRILLATORS, AND ENHANCED MEDICAL
KITS: FILLING A VOID OR CREATING A DUTY?
JULIE A. BUFFINGTON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 498
II. MEDICAL FOUNDATION-CARDIAC HEALTH
ISSU E S ............................................. 502
A. CARDIAC RESUSCITATION: ACCEPTED MEDICAL
G UIDELINES ..................................... 503
B. DEFIBRILLATOR OPERATION ........................ 503
C. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: TIMELY DEFIBRILLATION AND
FLIGHT ATTENDANT DEMANDS .................... 504
1. The Ten Minute Window .................... 505
2. Consequences of Delay ........................ 505
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL
D EV ICES ........................................... 507
A. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS .............. 508
B. THE AUTOMATIC EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATOR
CLASSIFICATION ................................. 508
C. ALTERNATE APPROVAL PROCEDURE: SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENCE ................................... 509
IV. AVIATION USE OF AEDS ......................... 511
A. FAA v. FDA REGULATIONS ...................... 511
B. FAA V. FDA- TRAINING Zss vs ................... 512
C. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLIANCE WITH FDA
PROCEDURE ..................................... 515
V. THE AVIATION LIABILITY ANALYSIS AND
PREEMPTION UNDER THE AVIATION MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1998 ....................... 516
A. AN AIRLINE'S LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL
C ARE ........................................... 516
1. The Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998.. 516
2. The ACLS Algorithm ......................... 518
B. IMPLICATIONS OF ONE AIRLINE'S DEFIBRILLATOR
PO LICY .......................................... 520
497
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
VI. LEGAL PRECEDENT AND INTERNATIONAL
PREEMPTION ISSUES ............................. 522
A. INTERNATIONAL PREEMPTION ...................... 522
1. Liability Under the Warsaw Convention ....... 522
2. Preemption by DOHSA ....................... 524
B. THE LACK OF NEGATIVE LEGAL PRECEDENT ..... 525
C. TilE AIRLINES' DuTY OF CARE ..................... 527
1. Restatement (Second) of Torts ................. 527
2. The Argument for Voluntary Assumption of a
H igher D uty ................................. 529
3. The Restatement's Reliance Factor ............. 532
4. Higher Duty, Airlines, and AEDs ............. 534
VII. AIRLINE RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 535
VIII. CONCLUSION ..................................... 538
I. INTRODUCTION
MAGINE YOURSELF embarking on a flight. Uncharacteristically,
you arrived in plenty of time, boarded, and are now beginning to
relax in anticipation of an uneventful three-plus hours. The plane is
first for takeoff and races down the runway, soaring into the air. You
recline upon reaching the cruising altitude of 35, 000 feet.
Just when you are about to doze off the man next to you starts to
fidget. You do your best to ignore him, hoping he will settle down so you
can rest. Then, because he begins to moan, you look over and witness
the beginning of an in-flight emergency.
Once restless, the man is notably uncomfortable. He is very pale and
perspiring heavily. You ask him if everything is all right, but he replies
incoherently. Now alarmed, you press your call button to summon the
flight attendant. But no one comes right away. All of the flight attend-
ants are busy preparing for cabin service. You wait, silently witnessing
the distress experienced by your traveling companion. It has not been
that long since you pressed the call button, so you wait longer, obeying
the still lit fasten-your-seat-belt sign and continue to worry as the minutes
tick by...
The United States is world-renowned for its excellent health
care system. This country is abundantly proud of the fact that
medical assistance is available within minutes of most emergency
situations. Now, some airlines have taken this service to the air.
In an effort to save lives, one U.S. airline' and several interna-
l American Airlines was the first U.S. airline to equip overseas flights with port-
able defibrillators. See American Airlines, Inc., AMR Corp. Communications,
American Airlines To Put Defibrillators on Aircraft (visited Aug. 26, 1997) <http://
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tional airlines2 have taken the unprecedented step of equipping
certain aircraft with cardiac defibrillators. 3
The objective of this Comment is to assess the legal implica-
tions surrounding an airline's decision to provide additional in-
flight emergency medical care services. Specifically, this Com-
ment analyzes the scope of the duty of care issue with respect to
an air carrier's decision to equip its planes with portable
defibrillators or, alternatively, not to take this step until required
by law. According to the American Medical Association, airlines
should be commended for providing this enhanced service. 4
The American Medical Association demonstrated its support of
American Airlines's decision to equip certain planes with
defibrillators by sponsoring the airline's conference on defibril-
lation. At the conference, the air carrier stated that "'sudden
cardiac events [are the] most common in-flight event, and are a
major cause of medical (aircraft) diversions. ' ''1
The American Heart Association's promotion of defibrillator
access, like American Airlines's promotion, is premised on sav-
ing lives; if an air carrier's subsequent actions can prevent even
a minute percentage of the millions of air travelers in this coun-
try from post-cardiac-arrest death then they will be providing an
www.amrcorp.com/amr/novl996b.htm> [hereinafter AMR Corp. Communica-
tions]. According to Robert L. Crandall, American Airlines Chairman and chief
executive officer, "[t] his... [was] a significant step in ensuring the health of our
passengers." Id. Delta and United Airlines have also announced plans to equip
their entire fleet beginning in July 1998. See Edwin W. Brown, Medical Update:
Rying More Friendly Skies, MED. Eouc. & RIs. FOUND., June 1998, at 3. All "three
airlines expect to have their entire fleets capable of providing this emergency
service" by year's end. Id.
2 Quantas, Virgin Atlantic, and Air Zimbabwe presently carry defibrillators. See
John Crewdson, Survival in the Sky, FAA: In-flight Medical Emergencies Increasing,
CHI. TRIB. (visited Aug. 26, 1997) <http://www.chicago.tribune.com/news/in-
flight/051097.htm>.
3 This step was in response to increased efforts from the medical community
and travel agents to provide access to appropriate in-flight medical emergency
equipment. See Susan Okie, Doctors Complain Airplanes Lack Sufficient Medical
Equipment, WASH. POST, reprinted in DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 18, 1998, at 8A;
see also Tom Belden, Travel Agents Suggest Their Bill of Rights for Passengers On Air-
lines, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, July 13, 1998, at 23.
4 SeeJoseph J. Cottrell, et al., In-flight Medical Emergencies: One Year of Experience
With the Enhanced Medical Kit, 262 JAMA 653 (1989), available in 1989 WL
3078991.
5 Crewdson, supra note 2 (quoting American Airlines). According to Ameri-
can Airlines, "between 50 and 60 passengers a year are given cardiopulmonary
resuscitation by flight attendants, [which is] currently the only treatment avail-
able for cardiac arrest" on U.S. domestic flights. Id.
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invaluable service. 6 American Airlines alone is responsible for
over 80 million passengers.7
These added health precautions are welcome news to the trav-
eling public. Surprisingly, this news may not be welcomed by
the airline industry itself because these enhanced services may
come with an unanticipated high price-a higher standard of
care. As meritorious and humane as the American Medical As-
sociation's concept may seem, there are legal and non-legal is-
sues that must be addressed in deciding whether to provide, or
more importantly, not provide enhanced medical care services
in the sky.
Public policy considerations have generated tremendous sup-
port for enhanced medical care. Congress has acted to elimi-
nate some major legal hurdles for airlines and individuals
attempting to provide medical assistance for in-flight medical
emergencies. Specifically, the Aviation Medical Assistance Act
of 1998 (Aviation Act) provides liability limits for both the air
carrier and qualified medical professional aiding passengers in
need.8 The Aviation Act also provides for the issuance of addi-
tional regulations regarding mandatory medical equipment, as
well as mandatory training requirements, following a one-year
assessment of in-flight deaths that were potentially avoidable
given the availability of enhanced in-flight medical care. 9 This is
a dynamic area of regulation that must be monitored carefully
in order to ensure compliance.
Until mandatory requirements are issued, an air carrier must
analyze the liability implications surrounding the decision to up-
grade its in-flight medical services. This involves assessing sev-
eral areas in order to evaluate the carrier's potential liability for
this changing area of regulation. First, an air carrier must ad-
dress present regulatory issues. Among these are the questions
of whether a defibrillator is a regulated medical device and
whether a flight attendant or Good Samaritan may perform
6 See AMR Corp. Communications, supra note 1. The American Heart Associa-
tion "estimates that 100,000 lives a year could be saved if AEDs [Automatic Exter-
nal Defibrillators] were broadly deployed in areas where large groups of people
gather, such as on aircraft." Id.
7 SeeJohn Crewdson, 1st Airline in U.S. Adds Heart-SavingEquipment Defibrillators
Could Save Scores of Lives, Cm. TRi., Nov. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2727757
(Passenger figures reflect 1995 records). Delta was the carrier with the most pas-
sengers at 87 million. See id.
8 See Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 §§ 5(a)-(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701
(West Supp. 1998).
9 See id. §§ 2-4.
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defibrillation. Second, negligence and assumption of duty is-
sues must be analyzed. This includes exploration into the key
standard of care issue: By providing this service, thereby ac-
knowledging this need, is an airline assuming a duty to provide
advanced medical care to its passengers? If so, has this in-
creased the standard of care? Third, when an air carrier re-
stricts this service to limited flights, is that airline neglecting its
duty to passengers on its other flights?1 ° Fourth, when one air-
line provides this level of service, has it effectively put all other
airlines on notice, thus requiring all airlines to follow the state
of the art? Finally, the airline must analyze product liability and
preemption of state and federal law issues to determine the ex-
tent of an airline's potential exposure in equipping its planes
with defibrillators.
Part II of this Comment explores the requisite medical foun-
dation-by providing the medical guidelines for emergency car-
diac resuscitation, explaining what defibrillators are, and
demonstrating the benefit and necessity of early defibrillation-
and applies this information to the context of air carriers. Part
III discusses the federal regulation of medical devices with re-
spect to the particular type of defibrillator at issue and the re-
sulting potential liability. This part explores the procedures a
device manufacturer must follow as well as the broad latitude a
device manufacture enjoys in getting its product to market
through the FDA approval process. Part IV addresses aviation
use of defibrillators and enhanced medical kits. An air carrier's
compliance with both FAA and FDA regulations are explored as
well as the personnel limitation that results from use of defibril-
lators. Part V provides a legal assessment of the affirmative act
of an airline treating passengers with defibrillation. This part
provides an analysis of the liability implications as a result of the
Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998. Part V also explores an
airline's basic defibrillation policy, superimposing the emer-
gency cardiac resuscitation guidelines and realistic assumptions
that can be relied upon if an airline chooses to employ a less-
than comprehensive treatment program for ill passengers. Part
10 SeeJohn Crewdson, Code Blue: Survival in the Sky. Crucial Moments after a Car-
diac Arrest., CHI. TRiB., June 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2685952. This issue
was raised in Crewdson's Chicago Tribune series reporting on airlines' use of
defibrillators. "[S]ome airlines fear they might open themselves to negligence
lawsuits if they limit defibrillators to some flights ... [because] they're acknowl-
edging a concern and a responsibility," therefore, potential liability may exist by
equipping only a portion of their fleet. Id.
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VI addresses international preemption issues and reviews the
common law for liability situations analogous to an airline's in-
flight emergency medical care treatment policy. This part ex-
amines the underlying duty-of-care issue and the issue of
whether voluntary acts, as a result of a common carrier's inter-
nal policies, create a heightened duty. The analysis assesses this
issue utilizing a comparative analogy of both airline and com-
mon carrier applications of tort law. Part VI provides recom-
mendations that will allow an air carrier to balance the
competing concerns of providing adequate in-flight emergency
medical assistance while minimizing both the legal and non-
legal costs of providing this service. In conclusion, Part VIII pro-
vides encouragement-from this potential recipient of in-flight
emergency aid-to air carriers to fully deploy defibrillators and
expanded medical kits on every airplane.
II. MEDICAL FOUNDATION - CARDIAC
HEALTH ISSUES
Heart disease is the number one killer in the United States. 1
With over 737,500 victims claimed in 1995, it is easy to under-
stand why members of the medical community have long advo-
cated "more accessible defibrillation" for all public places. 12 It is
well accepted that early defibrillation can give a heart attack vic-
tim a second chance at life. 13 Prior to the advent of modern
medical treatment, sudden death was the invariable result when
ventricular fibrillation occurred outside a hospital.'4 Defibrilla-
tion, one example of modern treatment, has established its
value in treating certain cardiac emergencies. 15
11 See Mark Clements & Dianne Hales, How Healthy Are We?, PARADE MAC., Sept.
7, 1997, at 4.
12 Crewdson, supra note 7; see also W. Douglas Weaver et al., Use of the Automatic
External Defibrillator in the Management of Out-oflHospital Cardiac Arrest, 319 N. ENG.
J. MED. 661, 661-66 (1988). See generally Malcolm McConnell, This Machine Could
Save Your Life, So Why Isn't It Widely Available?, READER'S DIGEST, Nov. 1997, at 69.
13 See Crewdson, supra note 7. Dr. Myron Weisfeldt, Chairman of Medicine at
Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in New York City and past President of the Heart
Association, believes that "early defibrillation alone can save lives" because exper-
iments in several cities have done so by equipping police officers and firefighters
with defibrillators alone. For example, in Seattle, where the average emergency
response time has been cut to eight minutes, "the survival rate among some
groups of patients is about 30 to 40 percent." Id.
14 See Peter Safar, Mickey S. Eisenberg's Life in the Balance: Emergency Medicine and
the Quest to Reverse Sudden Death, 337 N. ENG. J. MED. 206 (1997) (book review).
15 See id. "In cases of cardiac arrest the best hope for survival, and often the
only hope, is immediate defibrillation." Crewdson, supra note 10.
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A. CARDIAC RESUSCITATION: ACCEPTED MEDICAL GUIDELINES
The role that defibrillation assumes in cardiac incidents is
best understood within its context. Cardiac emergencies come
in different forms, only one of which is ventricular fibrillation.
"Ventricular fibrillation is the most common cause of cardiac
arrest."' 6  Defibrillation is effective to remedy ventricular
fibrillation.
Ventricular fibrillation, in layman's terms, is the condition
that results when a person's heart beat goes out of sync. Scien-
tifically, ventricular fibrillation is defined as "the sudden onset
of chaotic electrical activity in the muscle wall of the ventricle,
leading to disorganized quivering of the heart with no forward
movement of blood."' 7 "Ventricular fibrillation is a very treata-
ble disorder, in which a successful outcome is related to the
time from onset to defibrillation."18 Thus, time is the most criti-
cal factor.
B. DEFIBRILLATOR OPERATION
The defibrillator operates, through external shock, to electri-
cally stimulate the heart and restore its normal rhythm.
Defibrillation is technically known as "electrical cardiover-
sion."1 9 Electrical cardioversion is recognized as an effective
method used to restore the heart's rhythm for certain, but not
all, causes of fibrillation. 20 Again, timing is crucial. Unless "cor-
rective measures are undertaken promptly" the patient will "usu-
ally terminate fatally within 3 to 5 minutes. "21
16 Mayerline Michel, Portable Units Give Hearts A Jump-Start, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug.
15, 1998, at lB. Nationwide, 350,000 people die as a result of ventricular fibrilla-
tion. See id. (citing the American Heart Association).
17 Paul C. Sorum, Symposium on the Legal and Ethical Implications of Innovative
Medical Technology: Limiting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 57 ALB. L. REv. 617, 617-
18 (1994) (citing W.B. Kouwenhoven et al., Closed-Chest Cardiac Massage, 173
JAMA 1064 (1960); Arnold Sladen, Closed-Chest Massage, 251 JAMA 3137 (1984)).
18 Arthur L. Kellerman et al., Automatic External Defibrillator For Out-Of-Hospital
Cardiac Arrest, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 670, 670-71 (1989).
19 HEART DISEASE: A TEXTBOOK OF CARDIOVASCULAR MEDICINE 651 (Eugene
Braunwald ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter HEART DISEASE]. Doctor Braunwald's
textbook is widely recognized among cardiologists as the authority in the field.
Doctor Braunwald was the Chairman of Harvard Medical School.
20 See id. There are several causes of "tachycardias" for which electroconver-
sion "is not indicated." Id.
21 Id. at 709. This timeframe was confirmed by cardiologist Steven L. Shilling,
whom I thank for verifying the medical foundation of this Comment. Interview
with Steven L. Shilling, M.D., F.A.C.C., in Irving, Tex. (Aug. 29, 1997) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Shilling]. Another source provides a slightly more op-
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The overarching objective in a ventricular fibrillation scenario
is to restore normal heart function quickly. After doing so, it is
critical that the patient receive immediate follow-up treatment
as provided in the medical guidelines set forth by the American
Heart Association. 22 Importantly, this follow-up treatment is not
optional. Once the immediate crisis is over, the actual underly-
ing medical issue that initially caused the heart to fibrillate must
be remedied. If the underlying problem is not corrected, there
is a substantial risk of a recurrence of ventricular fibrillation or
death.23 Medical experts agree that "[v]entricular fibrillation
rarely spontaneously terminates and death results unless coun-
termeasures are instituted immediately. Subsequent therapy is
"124necessary to prevent a recurrence.
One thing is very clear: without early defibrillation, a victim's
opportunity to receive subsequent treatment will literally pass.
Medical experts warn that the electrical shock must be adminis-
tered immediately and "[tlime should not be wasted with cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation maneuvers if electrical defibrillation can be
done promptly. It is important to reemphasize that there should
be no delay in instituting electrical shock."' 25 Administered correctly,
airlines providing defibrillators are affording passengers who ex-
perience in-flight ventricular fibrillation a second chance of
survival.
C. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: TIMELY DEFIBRILLATION AND FLIGHT
ATTENDANT DEMANDS
A preliminary issue with airline use of defibrillators is whether
flight attendants, despite all their preexisting in-flight duties,
will be able to meet the medical guidelines requiring immediate
timistic timeframe by stating that "victims need to be shocked in five to seven
minutes to live. Each one-minute delay decreases the chance of survival by 10
percent." Michel, supra note 16.
22 See Crewdson, supra note 7. "The American Heart Association's defibrilla-
tion guidelines call for the use of epinephrine, lidocaine and other drugs in con-
junction with electric shocks." Id. Additionally, Congress has acknowledged the
"Advanced Cardiac Life Support" guidelines, and the "[c] omplex procedures...
[that] include the administration of drugs, electric shock, and intubation."
Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment Cases:
Coordinating Council on Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment Decision Making by the
Courts, Revised 2d ed., at App. C, available in 1993 WL LSMTCS APP C [hereinaf-
ter Guidelines].
23 See HEART DISEASE, supra note 19. "Frequent complex ventricular arrhyth-
mias are common during the first 48 to 72 hours after resuscitation." Id. at 779.
24 HEART DISEASE, supra note 19, at 710.
25 Id.
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response. For example, in the introductory hypothetical, the
flight attendant is unable to respond immediately to the call but-
ton because of numerous competing in-flight demands. Realisti-
cally, these demands may mean that a flight attendant will be
inaccessible for several minutes during boarding, take-off, cabin
service, cabin preparation, landing, and numerous other emer-
gencies and duties. Because of the demands of the position, it is
entirely possible that flight attendants will not meet the immedi-
acy requirement of the medical guidelines. But, without at-
tempting to defibrillate, a patient's chances of survival in the
instances where defibrillation could have been effective, are
slight. Thus, it is understandable that advocates in the medical
community support widespread accessibility to defibrillation.26
1. The Ten Minute Window
American Airlines's corporate medical director, Dr. David
McKenas states that " [w] ith each passing minute, the chance of
survival by a sudden cardiac arrest victim decreases by 10 per-
cent. ' 27 "If a shock can be administered within the first min-
ute-something that is virtually impossible on the ground ...
the chances of survival approach 90 percent."2 Whether this is
a realistic time frame aboard an airplane is highly fact driven,
but-assuming a uniform decline in chance of survival-it is
easy for a lay person to calculate the window of opportunity to
be less than ten minutes.29
2. Consequences of Delay
Even this sub-ten minute opportunity to aid passengers comes
with a price to the provider. This is because the price of failure
to successfully resuscitate may be a wrongful death lawsuit.3 0
26 See Crewdson, supra note 7.
27 AMR Corp. Communications, supra note 1, at 1.
28 Crewdson, supra note 7. "Even if passenger and defibrillator are at opposite
ends of a Boeing 747 the time from collapse to defibrillation is likely to be well
under the optimum of five minutes .... Id.
29 The math is as simple as ten times ten.
so For a complete discussion see §§ V-VI infra notes 89-73 and text accompany-
ing notes. The new limits on liability provided by the Aviation Act do not shield
an individual attempting to provide in-flight medical assistance from "gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct." Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998
§ 5(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701 (West Supp. 1988). The issue becomes whether in-
adequate response time-given an airline's awareness of the ten-minute window
and timely-response training for its flight attendants-would rise to the level of
gross negligence. Notably, the air carrier itself is not liable for "acts or omissions"
1999] 505
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The majority of lawsuits filed for medical malpractice result
from failure to diagnose a heart condition .3  This fact is not
surprising when you consider that cardiac conditions are also
the most difficult to diagnose. Thus, lawsuits based on either
or both theories of wrongful death and negligence are often
products of surprise to the victims or their families and even to
the best and brightest of doctors. The difficulty in detecting cer-
tain less-than-obvious medical problems makes it entirely possi-
ble that neither of the parties-doctor nor patient-would have
suspected that a heart condition existed.
The diagnostic difficulty is the result of a myriad of nebulous
symptoms that alone may seem innocent. Cardiac conditions
are difficult to diagnose in some medical settings because even a
normal "strip" from an electrocardiogram (EKG) cannot be
taken as a green flag.33 Some symptoms can indicate either indi-
gestion or a serious heart problem and some cardiac conditions
must be caught in the act in order to be detected. 34 This diffi-
culty in detection results from the fact that a heart must be mal-
functioning at the time the patient is monitored in order to be
properly assessed. The rest is guess-work. Consequently, some
people may indeed have a heart condition but still be totally
unaware because their transient symptoms have evaded evalua-
under the act; however, because some airlines have also agreed to indemnify
their flight attendants for the use of defibrillators, the airline would ultimately
suffer the consequences. See Aviation Medical Assistance Act § (5) (a); see also Tel-
ephone Interview with John Hotard, AMR Corporate Community Speaker (Aug.
29, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hotard]. Interestingly, this may not
concern most defibrillator providers because some portable defibrillator manu-
facturers, in an effort to encourage the sale and use of their products, are provid-
ing indemnification to anybody who buys their devices. See Rodd Zolkos,
Defibrillators Save Lives But May Create Liability, Bus. INS., Aug. 10, 1998, at 3.
31 See Don Colburn, Heart Attack Cases Top Claims for Malpractice, WASH. POST,
May 21, 1996, at 25, available in 1996 WL 3080720. The authority for this health
law article was a study conducted by an insurance trade association finding that
the most common problems were delays in hospital treatment and follow-up procedures
"or delay in use of drugs to treat the heart attack." Id. (emphasis added).
32 See Braunwald, supra note 19, at 756. Symptoms "may occur during a period
of weeks before a cardiac arrest, [and] tend to be nonspecific for the impending
event." Id. "In 91 percent of the cases, doctors did not make the correct initial
diagnosis, often because the symptoms resembled those of other diseases. Those
symptoms included pain or pressure in the chest, shortness of breath, general
weakness, coughing, fever and chills." Colburn, supra note 31.
33 See, e.g., Snia v. United Medical Center of New Orleans, 637 So. 2d 1290 (La.
Ct. App. 1995) (finding of no negligence in patient's death when EKG was nor-
mal and doctor could not tell if patient was suffering from an asthma attack or a
heart attack).
34 See id. at 1294.
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tion. This can result in either the patient not seeking medical
treatment, or the cardiac condition itself not malfunctioning at
the time medical assistance is sought.
The above medical context underscores the gravity of cardiac
emergencies and the importance of defibrillator accessibility.
The proper assessment of a cardiac condition requires a com-
prehensive medical background that includes knowledge of
masquerading symptoms, the use and limitations of portable
defibrillators, and, in particular, the time constraints involved.
This assessment literally must be done in seconds because, by
the time a passenger is attended, little time will remain given the
minutes that have already passed.
Intermittent symptoms may lead to a decision to forgo an
otherwise necessary emergency landing. Would the above rec-
ommendation, by someone with training that includes the above
information, rise to the level of gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct when it is later determined that the passenger was in-
deed suffering from a heart attack? This concern is particularly
relevant for those airlines intending to use defibrillation tech-
nology to avoid emergency diversions when the indication from
the defibrillator is that all is clear. 5
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES
The automatic external defibrillator (AED) is the type of
defibrillator the airlines use. It is a modern version of the origi-
nal defibrillator with technology that first came on the scene in
Europe in the mid-1940s.3 6 The AED is a light-weight, battery
35 See Crewdson, supra note 2. Indeed, it has been stated that this is an addi-
tional benefit of carrying defibrillators. Because defibrillator models used by the
airlines can also provide an initial reading of the heart rhythm, some airlines may
believe they can also benefit by averting emergency landings when this initial
reading appears normal. Quantas is one example where the airline has used the
defibrillator to determine if an emergency landing is necessary. See id. In con-
ceding that not all defibrillations will be successful, Quantas wants to rely on
defibrillator readings to confirm that unfortunate outcome and continue on
course. See id. The Australian cardiologist "working closely" with Quantas stated
that "forgoing emergency landings in cases where defibrillation had been unsuc-
cessful might save the international aviation community more than $6 million a
year." Id. (emphasis added). At least Quantas is not suggesting that a successful
defibrillation-or worse, a "normal" reading-precludes the need for an emer-
gency landing. One fact is important: it is clear from the above discussion that
emergency landings will still be required in either instance because follow-up
emergency care with certain prescription drugs is a critical aspect of the ad-
vanced cardiac life support analog.
36 See Safar, supra note 14.
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operated, portable medical device that is easy to use. These fea-
tures satisfy airline requirements and permit the device to be
carried and used onboard planes.3 7 The AED is considered a
medical device and is subject to approval by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) .?
A. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
The 1976 Medical Device Amendments established three
medical device classes, each of which are subject to increasing
levels of regulation.3 9 Class I devices are subject to general con-
trols, which are applicable to all medical device classes.4 ° Gen-
eral "controls include registration and listing requirements;4"
good manufacturing practices compliance;42 records and re-
ports requirements;43 susceptibility to special remedies for viola-
tions,44 including notification, banning, repair, replacement, or
refund; and the general prohibitions against adulteration4 5 and
misbranding.""6 Accordingly, Class II and III medical devices
are subject to these general controls as well as additional con-
trols indicated by their specific classification. 7
B. THE AUTOMATIC EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATOR CLASSIFICATION
The FDA divides "DC-defibrillator" products (AEDs) among
the latter two classes according to the amount of energy they
produce. This energy is expressed by the amount of joules or
37 See Hotard, supra note 30. Per Mr. Hotard, American Airlines tested a "gro-
cery cart full" of the various AED models to determine which would be easiest to
use. Id. The battery is required to last for five years, but it will require more
frequent recharging. See id.
38 See 21 C.F.R. § 870.5300 (1997). These types of defibrillators are classified as
"Cardiovascular Therapeutic Devices" under the regulation. See id. at § 870.
39 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
40 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1994).
41 See § 360.
42 See § 360j (f).
43 See § 360i.
44 See § 360h.
45 See § 351.
46 JAMES O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 18.05 (2d ed. 1993) (in-
ternal footnote numbers revised to match Comment footnote numbers); see also
21 U.S.C. § 352 (1994).
47 See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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watts per second of shock the AED can deliver." Low-energy
AEDs are those that deliver "a maximum of 360 joules of en-
ergy . . . through paddles placed .. . on the surface of the
body."49  High-energy DC-defibrillators deliver a "shock of
greater than 360 joules" in the same manner.50 According to
federal regulations, the former category of low-energy defibril-
lators is subject to Class II performance standards, 5' and the lat-
ter category is subject to the more stringent Class III premarket
approval standards.5 2 Both standards are designed to ensure
that the medical device is safe and effective when used on
humans.5 The difference is due to the fact that Class III devices
may pose potentially unreasonable risks of injury, therefore, are
subject to the rigors of the general approval process prior to
being marketed.54
The specific AED that American Airlines has chosen is a low-
energy defibrillator.5 As a result, the AED is only subject to
Class II performance standards 6.5  This means that the product
was not subjected to the same premarket approval standards as a
higher-energy-emitting device from Class III. Despite this proce-
dural difference, the specific classification of the AED is of little
significance when the manufacturer chooses an alternate and
speedier route of approval based on substantial equivalence.
C. ALTERNATE APPROVAL PROCEDURE:
SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE
Substantial Equivalence is an alternate approval route that ex-
ists for those devices, like the AED, that are based on the earlier
technology of devices that have already been on the market.57
48 See 21 C.F.R. § 870.5300 (1997); see also Heartstream, Inc., The Background
Behind Our Technology; Innovations in the Development of Therapy (visited Sept. 9,
1997) <http://www.heartstream.com/tech/tech3.htm>.
49 21 C.F.R. § 870.5300(a).
50 Id. § 870.5300(b).
51 See id. § 870.5300(a) (2).
52 See id. § 870.5300(b) (2).
53 See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
54 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e, 360c(a)(2)(C) (1994).
55 See AMR Corp. Communications, supra note 1. The AED is called the Fore-
runnerTM and is manufactured by Heartstream, Inc. of Seattle.
56 See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 448 F. Supp. 776,
778 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (describing performance standards corresponding to each
device class).
57 See Dutton v. Acromed Corp., No. 69332, 69333, 69358, 1997 WL 15248, *1-2
(Ohio App. Jan. 16, 1997) (holding that the medical device does not satisfy the
substantial equivalence process).
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This alternative approval route bypasses the premarket approval
steps necessary for new devices on the theory that the new man-
ufacturer is not changing the basic technology that was subject
to the approval process, therefore, the new device is "substan-
tially equivalent" in both design and function to a "predicate
device."58 For example, if a new device is basically a duplicate of
an existing device with a different brand name, it can get to mar-
ket via the FDA's substantial equivalence process. This method
of approval was developed to resolve the tremendous backlog of
new medical device approvals at the FDA. The logic is based on
the following premise: because the original device is already be-
ing used safely on humans, then the "knock-off" must also be
safe. The only flaw with this logic is that the original device may
also have circumvented the rigors of new product testing.59
In the case of AEDs, substantial equivalence is the most cost
efficient method of approval. FDA regulations are liberal and
even permit this shortcut when a device is technologically differ-
ent as long as clinical data "demonstrates that the device is as
safe and effective as a legally marketed device and [the substan-
tially equivalent AED] .. .does not raise different questions of
safety and efficacy than the predicate device."60 As a result,
under this alternative approval process, also known as the
510(k) or Premarket Notification process (named for the appli-
cable section of the Medical Device Amendments), it is possible
for a device manufacturer to get its product to market years ear-
lier than would otherwise be possible. 61
The applicable federal regulation stipulates what is to be in-
cluded in the premarket notification submission.62 The regula-
tion requires a manufacturer who desires to put its substantially
58 21 U.S.C. § 360c (f) (1) (A) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 (1997).
5q See Scott E. Sanders, Product Liability: Getting to the Heart of the Matter: Medical
Device Preemption Defense Skips a Beat as Plaintiffs Are No Longer Completely Precluded
from Bringing State Product Liability Claims Against Medical Device Manufacturers, 36
WASHBURN LJ. 319, 324-26 (1997) (discussing the concern of pre-Medical Device
Amendment of 1976 "grandfathering" of medical devices that are later used as
the basis for a new device's substantial equivalence).
60 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). It is interesting to note that Heart-
stream, the manufacturer of the AED being used on American Airlines, claims in
its literature to have "developed a proprietary waveform," which would be an ex-
ample of new technology, but the AED received marketing clearance through
substantial equivalence to existing AEDs. Heartstream Inc., supra note 48
(Biphasic Waveform).
61 SeeDutton, 1997 WL 15248 at *2 (denying 510(k) because the device was not
substantially equivalent).
62 See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (1997).
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equivalent product to a new use to "include appropriate sup-
porting data to show that the manufacturer has considered what
consequences and effects the . . . new use might have on the
safety and effectiveness of the device."63
IV. AVIATION USE OF AEDS
Whether the airline's use of AEDs by flight attendants is con-
sidered a "new use" of the substantially equivalent device is sub-
ject to debate. A broad interpretation of the term "use" is
consistent with the original use of AEDs: emergency treatment
of cardiac arrest. Conversely, a narrow interpretation yields an-
other possibility: because lay persons (flight attendants) will be
the ones using the AEDs on airplanes, the actual use is different
and could affect the safety and effectiveness of treatment.
A. FAA v. FDA RcGULA TIONS
The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) noted similar concerns
in its discussion of a final ruling on the required contents of
airplane medical kits.64 The present medical kit contents were
established to "eliminate [ ] equipment and drugs which, if mis-
used, could compromise the health of the passengers and the
safety and security of the flight."65 The FAA modified the pro-
posed requirements of the medical kits to exclude "all surgical
instruments and controlled drugs" for the above safety rea-
sons.66 Notwithstanding the FAA's caution, major airlines have
plans to enhance their on-board medical kits to include addi-
tional prescription drugs in order to be consistent with the goal
of equipping planes with AEDs: to eliminate unnecessary health
63 Id. § 807.87 (g); see also Crewdson, infra note 103 (an airline's application is
arguably different).
64 See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1221 (1986). The approved emergency medical kits
required contents are: Sphygmomanometer, Stethoscope, three Airways, four Syr-
inges, six Needles, 1-50% Dextrose Injection, Epinephrine (two single doses), two
Diphenhydramine HC1 injections, ten Nitroglycerin tablets, and basic instruc-
tions. See id. at 1223. Notably absent is a scalpel. Although doctors have re-
quested this instrument to be included in the medical kits reserved for their use,
the FAA and the airlines have not done so because a scalpel may be used in a
hijack situation or could cause more harm than good to a passenger. A similar
argument can be made concerning a defibrillator's shock when used to arm a
potential hijacker.
65 Id. at 1221.
6 Id.
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risks in not being able to aid fully a passenger in distress.6 7 The
present difference in the ability to render comprehensive medi-
cal assistance, given the availability of AEDs and present drugs, is
that flight attendants are not permitted to administer prescrip-
tion drugs. Thus, the passenger-patient's ability to receive the
benefits of comprehensive medical treatment will depend on
whether a licensed, medical professional is on board as a passen-
ger and is additionally willing to render aid in the emergency.68
B. FAA vs. FDA -TRAiNNG ISSUES
Training of the flight personnel who will be using the AEDs is
critical to the ability to aid effectively a passenger in distress. Is
an AED akin to a prescription drug, only to be administered by a
licensed professional? Is it permissible for non-medical person-
nel to administer the shock of the AED? Both the AED manu-
facturer and the airlines argue that any risks of improper use are
neutralized by proper training. Training issues for the manufac-
turer's personnel are covered in the "Good Manufacturing Pro-
cess" part of the FDA regulation. 69 The 510(k) Summary for the
AED examined in this Comment contained no mention of spe-
cific training for the defibrillator users. 70 Still, federal regula-
tions clearly require notice in the 510(k) when a device "is
67 Both American and Delta airlines have publicized their plans to enhance
their on-board medical kits. See Statement of Denise C. Hedges, President, Asso-
ciation of Professional Flight Attendants, at the House Transportation and Infra-
structure Committee Aviation Subcommittee (May 21, 1997), in Federal
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, 1997 [hereinafter Hedges];
see also Okie, supra note 3 (regarding Delta's decision to expand its medical kit).
American has "ordered 745 expanded medical kits ...that includes [sic] pre-
scription medicine, IV equipment and surgical instruments." American Airlines
Plots Course to Total Air Care, MED. INDUS. TODAY, Mar. 9, 1998.
68 Indemnification of Good Samaritans and an airline's ability to rely on a
"medically qualified individual" were key motivations in passing the new Aviation
Medical Assistance Act of 1998. Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998
§ 5(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701 (West Supp. 1998). Given the present staffing limita-
tions, however, adequate administration of follow up care with prescription
drugs, when supplied, depends on the presence of a Good Samaritan passenger
who also happens to be a doctor.
69 See 21 C.F.R. § 820.25(b) (1997). "Each manufacturer shall establish proce-
dures for identifying training needs and ensure that all personnel are trained to
adequately perform their assigned responsibilities." Id.
70 Because only non-confidential portions of the summary 510(k) form are
available to the public, it is not known if the complete application included this
information. See Telephone Interview with Carol Fedorcheck, FDA Medical De-
vice Division Small Business Advisor (Oct. 21, 1997) (on file with the author).
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intended for lay use where the former intended use was by
health care professionals only."'"
FDA regulations only restrict the use of a medical device to
medical specialists when it has a "potentiality for harmful effect,
or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to
its use [are] not safe except under the supervision of a practi-
tioner licensed by law to direct the use of such device, and...
'adequate directions for use' cannot be prepared." '72 Generally,
a Class II medical device would not rise to this level of regula-
tion, especially when the device was approved through the
510(k) process. This is because this restriction is only justified
by a formal finding by the FDA that the safety and effectiveness
of the device requires "specific training or experience in its
use." Accordingly, because no formal findings are ever made
under the informal 510(k) procedure, the FDA does not restrict
the use of the Class II AED.11
The FDA 510(k) process only requires that the manufacturer
establish that the device works in the environment proposed.7
5
In airline use, this requirement could be met by a showing that
the AED does not interfere with the airplane's electronics.76
Thus, once the FDA approves a 510(k), it is up to the product's
71 21 C.F.R. § 870.9(a) (1997). This rule applies to limitations of exemptions
of premarket notification for Class I devices that would otherwise be exempt
from this section. Likewise, the FDA would require a Class II manufacturer to
disclose this difference in use so that the safety and effectiveness within this con-
text can be evaluated. An air carrier may counter that because the AED's use is
under the guidance of a medical doctor, either on staff or by contract with the
carrier, the flight attendant's use would not be a "lay" use.
72 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1997). This restriction would seem to fit the original
defibrillator device with greater than 360 joules, but apparently not the AED,
because a strong argument can be made that "adequate directions for use" can
be prepared and the low joules emitted are safe. Id.
73 21 U.S.C. § 360e(1) (1994).
74 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996) (citing Lohr v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 1995) (a finding of substantial equiva-
lence is not a formal finding of safety nor an act of FDA approval)).
75 See Fedorcheck, supra note 70.
76 Because information regarding airline use was not included in the specific
510(k) summary for the Forerunner AED, it cannot be assumed that this require-
ment was in fact met. If it was not, the manufacturer could be held liable for
adulteration by not complying with an applicable premarket approval
requirement.
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end-user to provide for proper staff training.77 Liability for neg-
ligent use is the carrier's penalty for failure to train properly. 7
The AED is not classified as a "prescription device"; therefore,
the device is not subject to specific performance standards and
the extensive ramifications attending that classification.79  Per-
formance standards for flight attendants in the use of AEDs fall
under their regular first-aid training as well as additional train-
ing provided by the carrier in the use of the AED.8 ° The critical
issue as to whether medical supervision is required when ad-
ministering the shock of an AED is contingent on whether the
device could harm a person. It appears that the answer is no.
The low amount of joules emitted by the AED mitigates against
harm because the shock is to be administered only when a pa-
tient is unconscious. The result is no pain, and accordingly, no
harm accompanies the proper use of an AED. In contrast, an
incorrect assumption regarding a patient's state of conscious-
ness may indeed mean that a person would feel the jolt from the
AED and experience a great deal of pain.8'
77 The FAA leaves training up to the individual airlines and does not even re-
quire C.P.R. training for flight attendants. See Okie, supra note 3, at 8A. Airlines
do train their attendants to administer C.P.R., but this is not required by the FAA.
Of course, each state may have its own statutes covering training, depending on
the intended application (for example, specific emergency medical training for
paramedics).
78 Gross negligence is now the standard. See Aviation Medical Assistance Act
(AMAA) of 1998 § 5(b), 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (West Supp. 1998). Per American
Airlines, flight attendants demanded indemnification prior to giving their con-
sent to use AEDs, thus the carrier would pay any damage award. See Hotard, supra
note 30.
79 See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Food and Drug Admin, 448 F. Supp. 776, 780
(N.D.N.Y. 1978). Restricted devices were formerly known as prescription devices.
See id. at 780. The FDA determines, "in accordance with a rather subjective stan-
dard set forth in the statute, which particular medical devices should be re-
stricted." Id. at 779 (footnote omitted). The Becton court further explained that
the "theme of the 1976 Amendments call [s] for.., collaboration from members
of the industry, practitioners, and experts within the field" in determining which
devices should be restricted. Id. at 780.
80 See Hedges, supra note 67, Representative John J. Duncan, Jr., R-Tenn., the
present chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, stated that the present
level of training for flight attendants "is not much more than a basic first-aid
course." Richard Powelson Scripps, Congress Wants Details on In-Flight Emergencies,
PORT ST. LUCIE NEWS, Dec. 30, 1997, at Al.
81 See Shilling, supra note 21. Per Dr. Shilling, and contrary to the belief of
many, a shock, irrespective of a patient's need for it, would not put the patient in
a worse physical state than had the shock been omitted (it would, however, hurt a
great deal).
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Accordingly, an argument for "harmful effect" in the case of
an AED misapplication could be made, thus requiring medical
supervision. In response, an AED manufacturer's counter-argu-
ments are: (1) misuse and resulting "harmful effects" are un-
likely because the AED is very simple to use (adequate directions
for its use are provided, and an AED contains its own internal
diagnostic software that determines whether a shock is necessary
for a particular patient); and (2) the device is not a restricted
device, therefore, "harmful effects" are not an issue.
The AED's virtually "idiot-proof" operation, utilizing voice or
visual prompts after attaching leads to the patient, supports a
device manufacturer's argument that "harmful effects" are un-
likely.8 2 The AED prompts guide the user to determine,
through diagnostic software, whether or not the attendant
should to administer the shock. Consequently, a manufacturer
will argue that specific medical knowledge or training is not re-
quired for the safe and effective operation of an AED device
because adequate directions are provided to avoid "harmful
effects."
C. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLIANCE WITH FDA PROCEDURE
Compliance with the 510(k) procedure has been used as a
defense in products liability actions against manufacturers.83 In
the past, courts have accepted this defense on the basis of fed-
eral preemption of certain state law claims.84 The Supreme
Court changed this in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, holding that the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 do not preempt all state
common law negligence claims against a device manufacturer. 5
Other courts have similarly held that because substantial equiva-
lence focuses on equivalence and not safety, state claims are not
preempted. 6 The critical distinction is whether the approval
82 Author Mark Fritz points out that "[t]he latest generation of supposedly id-
iot-proof defibrillators cost about $3,000 and weigh five pounds." Mark Fritz,
Putting A Heart Saver In Hands of Novices, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 7, 1998, at
F3.
83 See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, reh'g denied, 873 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1989) (failure-to-warn and labeling claims of Class II medical device
held preempted).
84 See id. at 246.
85 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996).
86 See Moore, 867 F.2d at 246 (Class II devices are not subject to premarket
approval, therefore claims for defective design are not preempted). See generally
Sanders, supra note 59 (extensive discussion of the preemption issue regarding
medical device products liability).
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process subjected the medical device to a stringent premarket
review or the lesser standard of premarket notification.7 The
general rule is if substantial equivalence was the means used to
get the device on the market, certain state law claims will not be
preempted by federal law because premarket review was not
required."'
V. AVIATION LIABILITY ANALYSIS AND PREEMPTION
UNDER THE AVIATION MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 199889
Medical care providers, because of their special relationship
to their patients, are vulnerable to liability claims if they negli-
gently choose to provide only one part of an established multi-
component treatment plan in rendering aid." Similarly, flight
attendants, fully trained and aware of the Advanced Cardiac Life
Support (ACLS) guidelines for ventricular fibrillation, may be
liable for failure to complete their affirmative duty once they act
to treat the victim.
A. AN AIRLINE'S LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CARE
Air carriers make use of informed and competent medical ad-
vice, usually in the form of medical doctors as employees or con-
sultants." As common carriers, airlines have a duty to provide
"reasonable" medical care when the need becomes apparent. 92
1. The Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998
Prior to the Aviation Act, Good Samaritan laws did not shield
air carriers from liability because providing reasonable care was
87 See Dow v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 899 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D. Mass. 1995).
88 See Moore, 867 F.2d at 246.
89 Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998, 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (West
Supp. 1998).
90 The various states are replete with examples of cases claiming failure to diag-
nose, wrongful death, and loss of chance of survival. The state of Texas provides
several recent examples. See Eoff v. Hal & Charlie Peterson Foundation, 811
S.W.2d 187 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ); see also McCall v. Dallas Hos-
pital District, No. 05-94-01816-CV, 1995 WL 500288 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 22,
1995, writ denied) (survivors brought wrongful death action against hospital alleg-
ing negligent use of hospital equipment in failure to evaluate tests properly when
the tests indicated that a patient had a significant and foreseeable risk of a heart
attack from which he later died).
91 See AMR Corp. Communications, supra note 1. American Airlines employs
Dr. David McKenas as its Corporate Medical Director. See id.
92 See RESTArEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
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viewed as part of their duty to their passengers.93 This reason-
able care, while still generally applicable, now comes with the
added benefit of no liability for damages. Under the Aviation
Medical Assistance Act:
[A] n air carrier shall not be held liable for damages in any action
brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the perform-
ance of the air carrier in obtaining or attempting to obtain the
assistance of a passenger in an in-flight medical emergency, or
out of the acts or omissions of the passenger rendering the assist-
ance, if the passenger is not an employee or agent of the carrier
and the carrier in good faith believes that the passenger is a med-
ically qualified individual.94
In addition, the new Act provides that:
[A]n individual shall not be liable for damages in any action
brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or
omissions of the individual in providing or attempting to provide
assistance in the case of an in-flight medical emergency unless
the individual, while rendering such assistance, is guilty of gross
negligence or willful misconduct.95
Gross negligence or willful misconduct will be difficult to es-
tablish with respect to the actions of most Good Samaritan medi-
cal professionals. The knowledge that an air carrier or cardiac
specialist possesses cannot be imputed to a general practitioner
or some other non-specialist who may undertake to aid a passen-
ger in need. Therefore, most lawsuits naming an airline will
most likely result from either the absolute failure to provide
defibrillators or enhanced medical kits when they were aware of
93 See Aviation Medical Assistance Act § 5(a); see also Hotard, supra note 30.
AMR's Hotard stated that American Airlines and others in the medical commu-
nity were pushing for federal legislation to provide Good Samaritan indemnifica-
tion for AED use by flight attendants, as well as for all participants in a medical
emergency, in order to encourage Good Samaritan assistance. It seems that their
push was indeed successful. Under the Act not only is an airline protected, but so
is its good faith reliance on medically qualified Good Samaritans in administer-
ing emergency medical assistance. See Aviation Medical Assistance Act § 5(a).
The assistance of Good Samaritan doctor-passengers is critical to an air carrier's
ability to administer prescription drugs that will soon be available in the ex-
panded medical kits. See Hotard, supra note 30. This new legislation indemnify-
ing the Good Samaritan doctor-passenger may curb the negative trend of doctors
refusing to assist for fear of getting sued. But the change in federal law must be
disseminated in order to have this positive effect.
94 Aviation Medical Assistance Act § 5(a).
95 Id. § 5(b).
1999] 517
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
this need, given the actions taken by the industry leaders. 6 The
practice of the industry may serve to raise this aspect of the stan-
dard of care for all air carriers. Under this logic, it will be no
excuse that an airline can land in twenty minutes given the wide
variety of sources that make it clear that the time to treat is well
inside of ten minutes. 97 Other possible claims may be based on
a challenge to an airline's choice to provide only one part of a
multi-step emergency process when it is within their ability to
provide more than mere defibrillators. This latter theory, also
based on an airline's failure to perform, has a lesser chance of
success under the new Act's liability shield, but this will turn on
a court's interpretation of "performance."
2. The ACLS Algorithm
The complete ACLS algorithm for treatment of ventricular fi-
brillation is set forth in the medical texts. This algorithm is
widely referenced and requires, in addition to defibrillation, IV
access, the drug Epinephrine (administered to the patient every
five minutes), intubation (to open up the airway "if possible"),
and an additional repetition of drugs.9" An airline medical kit,
however, is not similarly equipped. Air carriers who venture
into the realm or advanced medical emergency care by provid-
ing defibrillation do not presently supply the essential drugs
that the ACLS treatment plan requires.9 9 This means that pas-
sengers treated with AEDs may still die without the balance of
treatment necessary.
96 The limits on liability arise out of an air carrier's "performance ... in ob-
taining or attempting to obtain [ ] assistance ... in an in-flight medical emer-
gency." Aviation Medical Assistance Act § 5 (a) (emphasis added). Notably, there
are no limits on liability for the failure to perform. See Higher Duty Airlines, and
AEDS, infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
97 This is the position of Southwest Airlines. SeeJ. Lynn Lunsford, Airlines Take
Initiative for Safer Flying Carriers Make Improvements Without Prodding from FAA, DAL-
lIAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 5, 1998, at 1A. "Our flights are of such short duration
that we are rarely more than 20 minutes from an airport," therefore defibrillators
are not as important as on a long-haul carrier. Id.
98 See HEART DISEASE, supra note 19, at 776-77. "[D] efibrillation and epineph-
rine are more important initially." Id. at 777. The treatment assumes a continua-
tion of ventricular defibrillation. After resuscitation, patients are maintained on
a lidocaine infusion. See id.
99 See AMR Corp. Communications, supra note 1. American Airlines has an-
nounced that they intend to "enhance [their] ... [doctors only] on-board medi-
cal kit . . . by adding certain prescription medicines to treat cardiac arrest";
however, this will not solve the problem for cases when only a flight attendant is
present. Id.
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This treatment gap will soon be partially remedied. American
Airlines, for example, has plans to include the essential prescrip-
tion drugs in "doctors only" medical kits.100 Still, the ability to
administer these drugs presumes that a licensed medical profes-
sional will coincidentally be onboard when a passenger has a
medical crisis.10 ' Thus, the treatment gap manifests itself in the
lack of on-board medical personnel. Even if all the necessary
medical equipment and medicines are present for a given in-
flight emergency, without a guarantee of adequately trained
medical professionals to administer the comprehensive treat-
ment, flight attendants will soon discover that they can treat few
passengers effectively. Admittedly, however, saving even a few
lives is better than none.
Soon, it will be possible to eliminate this treatment gap as ad-
vanced satellite technology in the form of telemetry becomes
available. The new technology will enaable air carriers to trans-
mit passenger health data to medical professionals on land who
can then dictate the steps necessary to save the passenger.0 2
This ability to diagnose, however, does not fully address the
present personnel gap. Flight attendants are not permitted to
administer prescription drugs. It remains to be seen whether
new laws will be enacted to permit this in some form. Until
then, air carrier personnel and Good Samaritans should be en-
couraged to do whatever they can using the means provided by
the air carriers. The reason is simple: presently, there is no po-
tential to land a plane within the critical ten minute window.
This means that timely follow-up care on the ground is not an
option and cannot be relied upon by the airline or the AED
manufacturer." 3 Worse yet, because of the present lack of the
100 See Hedges, supra note 67.
101 American Airlines states that a surprising amount of flights have doctor-
passengers on-board. See Hotard, supra note 30. The remaining question, how-
ever, is what are the doctors' medical specialties, which will determine their abil-
ity to aid. Nevertheless, any medical professional is better than flight attendants
alone who feel, with good reason, "more like the Three Stooges than superher-
oes" when they are "[w] ithout the aid of a medically trained professional." Gail
Todd, Lawsuit Threats Scare Off Good Samaritans In Medical Emergencies, CHICAGO
DAiLY HERALD, Aug. 9, 1998, at 3.
102 See Robert Davis, High-tech Idea Equips Planes for Medical Crises, USA TODAY,
Aug. 28, 1997, at 9A. American Airlines has successfully tested the equipment
that enables the simultaneous transmission of vital signs to doctors in hospitals.
See Brown, supra note 1. During this test, doctors were able to "correctly diagnose
20 different medical conditions simulated on board" the flight. Id.
103 See Crewdson, supra note 10, at 2-3. "Even under ideal conditions .... an
emergency landing from cruising altitude takes at least 20 minutes-longer, if
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complete ACLS medical supplies, neither the administration of
the essential prescription drugs nor intubation is possible within
the critical treatment period even if a doctor-passenger is pres-
ent and volunteers.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF ONE AIRLINE'S DEFIBRILLATOR POLICY
One airline has chosen, at least initially, to restrict the use of
defibrillators to over-seas, international flights.1"4 Given the
present lack of follow-up supplies on-board, passengers on those
flights who require resuscitation with a defibrillator will not re-
ceive any essential prescription drugs or intubation, if needed,
because the airplane does not carry these supplies, and under
the most optimal circumstances, it cannot land quickly enough
to get them because the airplane is over water.1"5 This airline
policy is based on the following premise: AEDs are expensive
and unnecessary for short-haul, over-land flights. Emergency
defibrillation will be provided only on flights that are both inter-
national and over water because on these flights it is impossible
to land the plane promptly. The airline reasons that the over-
land flights are potentially within twenty to forty minutes of
landing; therefore, medical care can be provided on the
ground, and defribillators are unnecessary.'0 6 Sounds good, but
a careful analysis of this premise reveals that, given the present
limitations of on-board medical kits, the passengers who are best
situated to receive both the in-flight defibrillation and the essen-
tial follow-up treatment are those passengers traveling over-land.
Those are the passengers who presently have the opportunity
both to be defibrillated and to get the requisite follow-up care
on land within a realistic time period after the onset of fibrilla-
weather, air traffic and other factors are less than perfect-and 20 minutes is too
long to wait for a defibrillator." Id. The President of the Association of Profes-
sional Flight Attendants puts the timeframe at a minimum of forty minutes. See
Hedges, supra note 67. Note that the ability to provide follow-up care is also the
basis for the manufacturer's substantial equivalence claim. But unlike the "sub-
stantially equivalent" AEDs that are used for land-based emergencies (where am-
bulances are only a 911 call away), airlines cannot provide the timely follow-up
care required with their use of AEDs. Therefore, there is a strong argument that
this difference in application-the lack of requisite follow-up care- would dis-
qualify the AED from being "substantially equivalent."
104 American Airlines has since announced that they will equip their entire
fleet with AEDs. See Brown, supra note 1.
105 See id.
106 See id. American does note that their ultimate objective is to have all planes
equipped with AEDs and enhanced medical kits. See Hotard, supra note 30.
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tion. The overseas passengers will not be able to receive the bal-
ance of the ACLS treatment plan in a timely manner; therefore,
they are still at risk without the further required follow-up treat-
ment necessary to sustain life until landing-often hours away.
Consequently, it is the over-land domestic passengers that an airline
can aid most effectively given the present limitations of both the
medical kit and the medical professional. Presently, the domes-
tic over-land passengers have the best odds of survival. They can
receive timely in-flight defibrillation and the requisite prescrip-
tion drugs after the plane makes a timely diversion. Ironically,
some air carriers insist that these over-land, short-haul flights
cannot benefit from the presence of an AED.10 7 This failure to
perform with respect to short-haul flights has the potential to
form the basis of a liability claim in a court of law. This is differ-
ent from an omission claim, the latter now covered under the
liability limits in the new Aviation Act.1 0 8 To illustrate the differ-
ence from an omission claim, a court might utilize the following
jury instruction:
Question to the jury: Did the airline know or should the airline have
known that defibrillation and drug therapy were critical to treating a
ventricular fibrillation ? Answer: Yes. Do you find that the airline in
question failed to provide "advanced cardiac life support" when it af-
firmatively acted to aid the victim of a heart attack at 35,000 feet? You
are instructed that ACLS is defined as:
Complex procedures used to restore and/or maintain breathing
and circulation in a person who has experienced cardiac and/or
respiratory arrest. Procedures include the administration of
drugs, electric shock, and intubation. Compare basic life sup-
port .... [Basic life support is defined as t]he relatively simple
resuscitative procedures used to restore and maintain breathing
and circulation in a person who has experienced cardiac or re-
spiratory arrest. Procedures include clearing the victim's airway,
administering mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, manually com-
pressing the chest to circulate blood in the absence of heart ac-
tion. Compare advanced cardiac life support.' 09
Compare a wrongful death claim based on the total absence
of advanced medical care.
107 See Lunsford supra, note 97 (statement by Southwest Airlines spokesman Ed
Stewart).
108 Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998 § 5(a), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44701 (West Supp. 1998).
109 Guidelines, supra note 22, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
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Question One: Do you find that the air carrier knew or should have
known that defibrillation AND drug therapy were critical to treating
a passenger experiencing ventricular fibrillation? Question Two:
Do you find that the air carrier FAILED TO PERFORM medical assist-
ance when it failed to obtain or attempt to obtain the medical
supplies that it was aware were necessary to treat medical emer-
gencies and are normally supplied by the major airlines in the
industry?
VI. LEGAL PRECEDENT AND INTERNATIONAL
PREEMPTION ISSUES
One justification that may have factored into an airline's deci-
sion to limit .the utilization of defibrillators to over-seas interna-
tional flights, aside from the obvious expense rationale, is
special liability protection. This rationale seems likely when you
consider that it was not until after Congress passed liability-limit-
ing legislation in the United States that air carriers began ex-
panding the use of AEDs to include domestic flights. Under the
special liability exemptions previously carved out through inter-
national treaties, air carriers have generally enjoyed limited lia-
bility with regard to international passenger situations. The
sparse case law that exists tends to side with an airline that has
fulfilled its basic duty to its passengers.
A. INTERNATIONAL PREEMPTION
1. Liability Under the Warsaw Convention
One example of an airline's special international liability pro-
tection is the Warsaw Convention, an international treaty bind-
ing on the United States. Under the Warsaw Convention, "air
carriers are liable for injuries sustained by a passenger on an
international flight [only] 'if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking." 110
The case of Ktys v. Lufthansa recently addressed the liability
issue when the passenger suffered a non-fatal heart attack dur-
ing a transatlantic flight and later alleged that the crew was neg-
ligent in failing to make an unscheduled landing in order for
the passenger to receive essential medical treatment that could
110 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1518 (11th Cir. 1997)
(quoting 49 Stat. 3018, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and "providing the
official English translation of the governing French text").
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have prevented some of the extensive damage done to his
heart."1 The plaintiff's suit, filed in Florida, sought damages
from the airline based on the theories of negligence and loss of
consortium. The defendant airline initially lost its summary
judgment motion, which was based on being preempted from
state liability through the Warsaw Convention.' 12 The airline
later appealed the common law negligence judgment on the
same grounds.' 1 3
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the preemption issue and,
quoting the Supreme Court, held that liability of an airline
under the Warsaw Convention is dependent on "the passenger
prov[ing] that an 'accident' was the cause of... injury."" 4 The
meaning of the word "accident" is critical to an airline's ability
to defeat a negligence claim when its defense is based on the
liability limits of the Warsaw Convention.
The meaning of "accident," previously split in the courts of
appeals, was resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Air
France v. Saks." 5 In Air France, the Supreme Court held that "ac-
cident" is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger." ' 6 The Court further explained that
"when the injury indisputably results from the passenger's own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation
of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident."" 7
In applying the above definition to the claim of negligence
due to an airline's failure to make an emergency landing when
presented with an in-flight heart attack, the Eleventh Circuit, in
Kys, determined that the Warsaw Convention "provides carriers
a 'due care' defense . . . turning on the absence of negli-
gence."" 8 Ultimately, the Krys court held that Warsaw preemp-
tion does not "extend the term [accident] to cover routine
n- Id. at 1517.
112 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
113 See Krys, 119 F.3d at 1517-18.
114 Id. at 1518 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985)).
115 470 U.S. at 396.
116 Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 406. One example of an accident preempted by the Warsaw Conven-
tion can be found in the case of Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998), where a child was burned by
scalding water spilled by a flight attendant. The Fishman court granted the air-
line's motion to dismiss based on the injury being the result of an "accident"
within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Fishman, 938 F. Supp. at 230.
118 Krys, 119 F.3d at 1522.
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travel procedures that produce an injury due to the peculiar in-
ternal condition of a passenger."' 19
Proceeding to the issue of negligent reaction to the symptoms
of a heart attack, the Krys court responded to Lufthansa's no-
negligence defense, notably based on the crew's deference to a
Good Samaritan doctor's assessment of the medical emergency,
by stating that this reliance does not relieve the airline of the
duty to exercise reasonable care. This duty of care includes
monitoring the medical crisis to "see what's happening and
make sure that it's correct, which was not done in this case,
and.., the results show what happens when the crew decides to
walk away from a situation because there's a doctor on the
scene."'2 Concluding that Lufthansa was liable for negligence
"so long as the delay [in landing the aircraft] aggravated the
damage to the heart," the Krys court affirmed the lower court's
negligence judgment against the airline. 121
2. Preemption by DOHSA
In addition to the Warsaw Convention, other preemption doc-
trines may serve to limit an airline's liability. The Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA) is one such defense. DOHSA pre-
cludes recovery for nonpecuniary damages and limits airline re-
sponsibility to monetary expenses suffered by the estate of the
decedent.122 In order for DOHSA to apply, the death must have
occurred "on the high seas beyond a marine league from the
shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories
or dependencies of the United States."'123
The expansive legal effect of DOHSA has also been reviewed
by the Supreme Court. In the case of Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines, 24 the Supreme Court held that "DOHSA precluded a
plaintiff from augmenting his DOHSA claims with damages
119 Id. at 1522.
120 Id. at 1527. Now, of course, an air carrier's reliance on a "medically quali-
fied individual" would absolve that air carrier from liability. Aviation Medical
Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998 § 5(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701 (West Supp. 1998).
121 Krys, 119 F.3d at 1528 n.25; see also Gingeleskie v. Westin Hotel Co., 145
F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as
to whether the hotel met its duty but that the car service had no duty to take
action until the condition became apparent and "we know of no duty that re-
quires common carriers to be expert in medical diagnosis.").
122 See Tandon v. United Air Lines, 968 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. .1997).
123 Id. at 942. In Tandon, the parties first disputed where the death occurred,
but the pilot's affidavit settled the matter, making DOHSA applicable. Id.
124 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
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claims brought under other laws, such as state law or general
maritime law." '125 This wide preemptive effect supplies one rea-
son why an airline would initially choose to limit the use of
defibrillators to over-water international flights.
DOHSA liability limits are economically enticing. This Act
precludes recovery for many high-dollar damage claims such as
loss of society, the anguish of survivors, and punitive damages.
Even the decedent's pain and suffering is precluded on the basis
that it is a plaintiff's survival claim.'26 But DOHSA limits must
not be the real reason for limiting defibrillator use because that
reason does not explain the fact that the first time a defibrillator
was used by a U.S. airline was during the domestic leg of the over-
seas flight, despite that airline's policy to limit use to over-water
international flights.1 27 This application would afford none of
DOHSA's protections. In addition, it would be unlikely that an
air carrier would specifically instruct its flight attendants to use
defibrillators only during the international legs of flights and to
deny defribillation to domestic-leg passengers. Thus, DOHSA
exemptions do not support the rationale to limit AEDs to cer-
tain flights.
The real motivation may well be as simple as the need to cau-
tiously roll-out the new service and to work out any intermediate
problems, with the overall goal being to equip all planes. Still,
the roll-out could have begun with the domestic legs since fol-
low-up medical care would have been more probable. As stated
above, however, the liability exposure prior to the enactment of
the Aviation Act was obviously a major factor in the decision.
This is ironic when you consider that the addition of defibril-
lators was supposedly driven by an air carrier's concerns for pas-
senger health.
B. THE LACK OF NEGATIVE LEGAL PRECEDENT
A second motivating factor in an airline's decision not to
equip its planes with AEDs may be the lack of negative legal pre-
cedent. The sparse case law that does exist on the subject of an
airline's failure to provide sufficient medical assistance tends to
side with the airline, provided that it has fulfilled its basic duty
of care to the passenger.
125 Tandon, 968 F. Supp. at 942 (citing Zicherman, 516 U.S. 217, 230 (1996)).
126 See id. at 942-44.
127 See Hotard, supra note 30.
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For example, in the case of Tandon v. United Air Lines,1 28 the
issue was inadequate oxygen available on the plane to treat the
deceased while she was suffering a heart attack during an inter-
national flight. In ruling that neither the heart attack nor the
failure to provide adequate oxygen were preempted by the War-
saw Convention, the court proceeded to discuss the open issue
of whether state law claims preempted recovery.129 Declining to
foreclose on this opportunity, the Tandon court permitted the
plaintiff to amend his complaint so that the fact issue could be
resolved by the court.
United Air Lines opposed the claim on the basis that it "did
not have a duty to maintain the medications, etc. that [the]
plaintiff alleges it was missing."130 The court permitted the
amended claim, noting that the FAA regulations only "enumer-
ate the minimal requirements for medicine kits" and that the
"[d]efendant has not presented any authority to support the
idea that the airline cannot, by law, be found to have breached
its duty of care once FAA regulations are met."1"' This case has
yet to be heard on the merits, but the applicable legal rule is
settled: if an airline acted without negligence in administering
care to the passenger, it will be held blameless.
But now the standard is even lower. According to the Avia-
tion Act, an air carrier shall not be liable if it performed by ob-
taining or attempting to obtain medical assistance. Additionally,
if a medically qualified passenger does volunteer to assist, that
individual will only be liable for gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct. 1 2 This new standard insulating air carriers should re-
move all barriers to the total deployment of both defibrillators
and expanded medical kits throughout their fleets.
The argument that assuming a higher standard of care will
give rise to a higher duty simply has not received support in the
courts. Other cases have held in favor of a common carrier, a
128 926 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing facts of case and the theory of
plaintiff); see also Tandon v. United Airlines, No. 94-CIV. 7002-DC, 1997 WL
158365 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1997) (permitting plaintiffs amended complaint in sub-
sequent case).
129 See Tandon, 926 F. Supp. at 370 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 408
(1985)). The Tandon court stated that the Supreme Court in Saks "declin [ed] to
express [a] view on [the] viability of state law claims where [the] injury was not
caused by an accident." Id.
13o Tandon, 1997 WL 158365, at *1.
131 Id. at *1.
132 See Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998 § 5(a)-(b), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44701 (West Supp. 1998).
526
AIRLINES AND DEFIBRILLATORS
hotel, and a mall-all of which had adopted broad internal poli-
cies. 133 The respective courts held that the voluntary assump-
tion of expanded medical treatment, without legal obligation,
did not create a greater duty to the plaintiffs.13 This principle is
best explained within the concept of the duty owed by a com-
mon carrier.
C. THE AIRLINES' Duiv OF CARE
An airline's liability, in this context, will turn on whether the
same special relationship and commensurate duty that is imput-
able to other common carriers who affirmatively act to adminis-
ter emergency care to their passengers also applies to air
carriers. This question can be answered by looking to the basic
legal principles and considerations that most states follow.
1. Restatement (Second) of Torts3 5
Sections 323 and 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts136 (Re-
statement) provide the standard applied to cases where plain-
tiffs allege that a common carrier owes its passengers a higher
duty of care. This legal theory has not always been successful.
One example of this is the case of Gingeleskie v. Westin Hotel Co.,
where a hotel guest who became ill and requested transporta-
tion to the emergency room died while in a shuttle service pro-
vided to the guest as transport.13 1 In Gingeleskie, the plaintiff
relied on the Restatement for her main argument in contending
that the duty of a common carrier was breached by the defend-
ant for failure to secure an ambulance.13  The basic principle
applied by the court can be found in section 323 of the
Restatement:
Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services. One
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render serv-
ices to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to
133 See Gingeleskie v. Westin Hotel Co., 961 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Ariz. 1997), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 19748 (9th Cir. Ariz. May 27, 1998)
(common carrier); Lundy v. Adamar of NJ., Inc., 34 F.3d 1173 (3d. Cir. 1994)
(hotel); Newsome v. Cservak, 130 A.D.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (mall owner).
134 See Gingeleskie, 961 F. Supp. at 1310; Lundy, 34 F.3d at 1173; Newsome, 130
A.D.2d at 637.
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
136 Id. §§ 323, 324.
137 961 F. Supp. at 1310.
138 Id. at 1315.
1999] 527
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the
harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking. 139
The common carrier in Gingeleskie countered that it was trans-
porting the passenger to the emergency room and asserted that
the Good Samaritan statute afforded an exemption to any legal
duty. '4 The court did not permit the defense, however, ex-
plaining that both the hotel and the car service had duties to act
under section 314A of the Restatement and that the "Good Sa-
maritan statutes do not apply to any duty created under
§ 314A.""' Section 314A provides that certain special relations
give rise to a duty to aid:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take
reasonable action (a) to protect them against unreasonable risk
of physical harm, and (b) to give them first aid after it knows or
has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for
them until they can be cared for by others.1 4 2
The Gingeleskie court then applied New Jersey law and defined
the "carrier's 'legal duty of care for the passenger's safety ... [as
being] care commensurate with the risk of harm . . .' [that]
would under all the circumstances deem prudent to obviate the
danger, known or reasonably... anticipated." 4 ' The court con-
cluded that the defendant's acts were reasonable because there
was no way of knowing that its passenger was having a heart at-
tack. The holding most critical to the analysis of airline liability
was that the internal policies of the plaintiff (in deciding
whether to have better trained staff or not) did not create any
greater duty owed to Gingeleskie."'
The district court, however, was reversed on this point by the
Ninth Circuit.'45 Applying Arizona law, the appellate court held
that a "genuine issue of material fact as to whether Westin Hotel
met its duty under § 314 .. . [because] an innkeeper or com-
131 Id. at 1316 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1317.
142 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(1) (1965)).
143 Id. (quoting Melicharek v. Hill Bus Co., 175 A.2d 238, 240 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1961)).
144 See id. at 1318-21.
145 See Gingeleskie v. Westin Hotel Co., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 19748 (9th Cir.
Ariz. Mayy 2, 1998).
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mon carrier must take reasonable steps to care for a patron,
once it is known or there is reason to know of a patron's ill-
ness."146 "This includes the duty to take reasonable steps to
'turn the sick man over to a physician."'147 The hotel's "policy
manual require [d] employees to call security in the event of a
request for medical assistance," and this policy was not followed
during the Gingeleskie crisis. 48
But, failing to follow company policy in providing care does
not insulate the carrier. The issue becomes one of "reasonable
action: in providing interim medical care.' 49 It could be argued
that reasonable action includes utilizing AEDs on every flight,
given the new industry standard providing this interim care.
Anything less could be characterized as a failure to perform
reasonably.
Now, with the Aviation Act, the only apparent means to attack
the standard of care is to show that the medically qualified indi-
vidual was aware that the condition was cardiac and was grossly
negligent.1 50 Examples of gross negligence include abandoning
treatment despite adequate medical supplies or mistreating a
patient given the knowledge available to the individual render-
ing aid. This is unfortunate for the Good Samaritan who now
will be the main target in suits for injuries arising from an in-
flight medical emergency. At first glance, it appears that a gross
negligence standard has the effect of encouraging passenger
volunteers; however, upon realization that this Good Samaritan
may be the sole avenue of legal redress, this legal exposure, al-
beit slight, may ultimately serve to discourage volunteerism.
This point becomes clear when noting that the alternative, suing
the air carrier, is foreclosed because of the absolute shield af-
forded air carriers and their personnel unless they fail to
perform.151
2. The Argument for Voluntary Assumption of a Higher Duty of
Care
The above quandary was the focus of another federal case ap-
plying New Jersey laws, Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, where the
146 Id. at *5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314A (1965)).
147 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)).
148 Id. at *5-6.
149 See Gingeleskie, 961 F. Supp. at 1316.
150 See Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 1998 § 5(b), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44701 (West Supp. 1998).
151 See id.
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defendant was a casino hotel in which Lundy was a guest.152 In
Lundy, the patron suffered a heart attack, and emergency medi-
cal assistance was provided by a service contracted for by the
hotel. In the service agreement, emergency aid for heart attacks
was to include more than CPR. An on-duty nurse arrived on the
scene and, within minutes, began performing CPR. The nurse
placed an "ambu-bag over Lundy's face while" others assisted,
including a Good Samaritan pulmonary doctor and a surgeon,
who continued CPR.15
3
At issue was the fact that the nurse failed to intubate the pa-
tron. 154 Intubation was among the medical treatment made pos-
sible in the contract between the casino and the medical service
company. The plaintiffs alleged that the hotel breached its duty
to its patron when it failed to provide for intubation during his
care. 5 5 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that because the ho-
tel "voluntarily assumed [a] duty" by contracting for intubation
services, it had breached this duty as well. 156
Disagreeing, the court quoted Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 314A, holding:
[T]he duty "to take reasonable action ... to give ... first aid" in
times of emergency requires only that carriers, innkeepers and
landowners procure appropriate medical care as soon as the
need for such care becomes apparent and provide such first aid
prior to the arrival of qualified assistance as [they] ... are reason-
ably capable of giving. Clearly, the duty recognized in § 314A
does not extend to providing all [the] medical care that the carrier or
innkeeper could reasonably foresee might be needed by a patron.157
Unlike the Gingeleskie court, the Lundy court afforded the
nurse protection under New Jersey's Good Samaritan Act, de-
spite the fact that she was an agent of the hotel. 158 The absence
of existing precedent prevented the Lundy court from finding
that the hotel's contract with the medical service agency consti-
152 34 F.3d 1173 (3d. Cir. 1994).
155 See id. at 1175-76.
154 See id. at 1177. According to cardiologist Steven Shilling, intubation is an
advanced cardiac life support technique that is very difficult to administer with-
out proper training and plenty of practice. See Shilling, supra note 21. Intuba-
Lion opens the airway to improve oxygen exchange, a technique commonly
utilized in emergency rooms. See Lundy, 34 F.3d at 1177.
15.5 See Lundy, 34 F.3d at 1178.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1179 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314A (1965)).
158 Id. at 1180.
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tuted a voluntary assumption of a duty beyond the Restatement.
This lack of precedent permitted the Lundy court to protect all
affirmative acts taken in aid of the patron as being within the
requirements of existing state law. '59 Additionally, the Lundy
court distinguished between a voluntary assumption of duty to
provide reasonable first aid-measures protected by the Good
Samaritan Act-and the voluntary decision "to provide intuba-
tion equipment for the use of physician employees of an in-
dependent contractor who were known to be qualified to use"
the equipment.16° The court held that the latter was not
equivalent to voluntarily providing "such equipment to strangers
who volunteer assistance at the site of an emergency." 161
This last distinction is analogous to the airline-defibrillator
context because defibrillators are to be used by trained flight
attendants, making them "qualified to use" the AED. This usage
can be distinguished from the special on-board medical kit that
an airline provides for doctors' use only. Thus, the airlines's vol-
untary decisions "to provide .. .equipment for the use of...
employees ... who [are] known to be qualified to use it" elimi-
nates Good Samaritan protections. 162 Then, one might ask, why
not go further and simultaneously provide the additional medi-
cal equipment needed to complete the care for cardiac
problems? The answer to this is most likely greater liability ex-
posure because of the controlled substances involved (flight at-
tendants would not be "qualified users"), the risk of harm to the
passenger (as in the case of administering overdoses), and the
licensing barrier. By limiting the expanded medical kits to doc-
tors only, the airlines limit the risk to the doctor's gross
negligence.
Interestingly, the Aviation Act only implies that airline person-
nel could not use these additional medical substances, but the
Act does not remove the liability limits so long as it is a "medi-
cally qualified individual. "1l 63 This means that under the Act an
airline may indeed be permitted to provide medically trained
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1181 n.ll.
161 Id.
162 Id. This is why the flight attendants insisted on indemnification prior to
agreeing to use AEDs. See Hotard, supra note 30. These acts are now protected
under the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998; 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701 (West
Supp. 1998).
163 Id.
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personnel who are not necessarily licensed and still enjoy the
benefits of limited liability.
3. The Restatement's Reliance Factor
The Restatement gives rise to further duty of care issues. Re-
statement section 323 contains a reliance component that affords a
right of action to those who suffer harm "because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking."'164 Reliance on the existence of
defibrillators is an example. The fact that there are air travelers
who fly an air carrier because of their defibrillator policy is
proof that this particular type of reliance exists.
Reliance gives rise to several unresolved issues in the air car-
rier context. For example, what happens when the defibrillator
does not work for some reason and the passenger specifically
chose the airline because of its ability to defibrillate? How many
defibrillators must each plane have, and where should they be
located to allow for the essential prompt access? If the passen-
ger suffers harm because of a delay in treatment caused by the
avoidable need to fully charge the defibrillator, will a fact issue
be raised?
Under the new Aviation Act, these claims are most effective
when alleged against the AED manufacturer. The airline in this
situation will defend on the basis of the Aviation Act's limits on
liability for omissions when undertaking to aid a passenger. 165
Therefore, unless the delay in treatment can be characterized as
a failure to perform, the airline will be protected. The pre-Act
approach was to defend on the basis of the Restatement's no-
greater-duty rule, pointing to its limited duty of care provision.
One case that involved the above issue was Fischer v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc."6 In Fischer, the plaintiff's medical expert testified
that the presence of a defibrillator and an adequate airway
would have made resuscitation "very likely."' 67 The airline
moved for summary judgment, contending that-in the absence
of negligence-proximate cause can only be established if the
chances of survival were more than fifty percent. The airline
argued that the plaintiff's own expert pointed out that the
164 Gingeleskie v. Westin Hotel Co., 961 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (D. Ariz. 1997),
affd in part and revd in part, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 19748 (9th Cir. Ariz. May 22,
1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)).
165 Aviation Medical Assistance Act § 5(a).
166 No. 85-C-08432, 1990 WL 129677 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1990).
167 Id. at *1.
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chances are only that good in a hospital's coronary care unit.168
The court denied the motion, holding that it was the defend-
ant's burden to use her own medical expert to establish "as a
matter of undisputed fact, that [the deceased passen-
ger's] likelihood of survival was 25 percent or less." 169
What is most interesting about the Fischer case is that it raises
the negligence issue when an attending medically qualified indi-
vidual does not go beyond basic CPR in resuscitating a passen-
ger experiencing a cardiac incident. Notably, the medical
expert testified that a defibrillator alone would not have been
enough without an adequate airway as well (the intubation step
in the ACLS algorithm). The above expert testimony supports
this Comment's main contention: defibrillators alone will not be
sufficient to resuscitate many passengers experiencing a cardiac
emergency.
The standard of care element has arisen in other instances
where reliance was not at issue. Most courts have sided with the
defendants in these cases. The legal standard only requires a
person to provide "reasonable care" in situations that it has "rea-
son to know" about. 70 In sum, case law indicates that airlines
who adopt the use of defibrillators are not faced with any
greater duty than the special relations duty which requires af-
firmative aid to a passenger in need of care until they can be
cared for by others. 17 1 Only the absence of reasonable care
when the airline became aware of a pasenger's need will subject
an airline to liability for failure to perform. This could create a
fact issue in cases where an AED fails to operate when needed.
The Gingeleskie court noted cases where no greater duty of
care was imposed.172 One example is in the case of Newsome v.
Cservak, where
the New York Supreme Court held that the defendant's internal
policy of sanding and salting the entrance to the parking lot and
- See id. The physician medical expert "discussed the probabilities of a per-
son being successfully resuscitated based on the general population. According
to [the expert], in a hospital coronary intensive care unit, the chance of being
successfully resuscitated ranges anywhere from 60 to 70 percent." Id. In contrast,
"if a person is stricken on the street, and even if advanced life support is pro-
vided, the success rate drops to from 10 and 20 percent." Id.
169 Id. at *3.
170 Gingeleskie v. Westin Hotel Co., 961 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (D. Ariz. 1997),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 19748 (9th Cir. Ariz. May 22,
1998).
171 See id.
172 Id. at 1320.
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roads of the mall did not create any basis for liability of the de-
fendant to the plaintiff. [The Newsome court] stated: "This argu-
ment is meridess since there is no basis for the proposition that a
party may be held liable for failing to follow a policy which it has
adopted voluntarily, and without legal obligation, especially
when there is no showing of detrimental reliance by the plaintiffs
on the defendants following that policy. 173
The Tenth Circuit also was cited by the Gingeleskie court as per-
mitting the internal policies of a defendant as evidence to show
negligence, but "such policies do not alter the applicable stan-
dard of care." 1 74
4. Higher Duty, Airlines, and AEDs
Conceding that an airline only owes its passengers reasonable
care under known circumstances, it could be argued that the
airline knew that there was a risk of cardiac incidents when it
undertook to treat them through defibrillation, but it ignored
this risk on some of its flights by failing to perform on those
flights with an AED. Certain passengers who happen to read an
airline's publicity concerning adoption of a policy of in-flight
defibrillation may indeed book their flights in reliance upon
this service, and, in good faith believe that AEDs will be available
for all flights. This scenario has the potential to become
grounds for a detrimental reliance cause of action in cases
where the AED was not provided. This failure to deliver could
be interpreted as a failure to perform on a particular flight. 175
It is not yet clear whether the liability limits of the new Avia-
tion Act will shield an airline from this type of claim when argua-
bly, the air carrier has not "performed."176 One thing is clear:
given this new legislation most claims arising out of the use of
AEDs will most likely be directed at the care provider or manu-
facturer. 17  Equally clear is the fact that AEDs can and do help,
173 Id. at 1320 (quoting Newsome v. Cservak, 130 A.D.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987)).
174 Id. (quoting Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1091
(10th Cir. 1994)).
175 See Aviation Medical Assistance Act (AMAA) of 19998 § 5(a), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44701 (West Supp. 1998). This argument does not factor in what performance
was attempted in rendering emergency medical aid; therefore, the fact that assist-
ance was given, despite the fact that AEDs were omitted, may provide a complete
defense based on the limitations on liability of air carriers under the Act. See id.
176 Id.
177 See Zolkos, supra note 30, at 3. Zolkos's article on the creation of liability as
a consequence of deployment of AEDs states that "manufacturers and purchasers
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even though they will not always be effective given the present
flight-attendant-to-passenger ratio. It takes little imagination to
conceive of normal in-flight fact patterns where it will be diffi-
cult for the attendant to timely defibrillate passengers given the
urgency required.
VII. AIRLINE RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above analysis, an airline's interim and future
policies warrant adoption of additional medical services that
may save passengers' lives. Unnecessary litigation is certain to
result, but with the Aviation Act, such suits will now target prod-
uct manufacturers or medically-qualified individuals who per-
formed the emergency treatment. As noted, the act of
providing expanded medical care does not, in itself, give rise to
an additional duty for a particular airline. Nor does it serve to
put other airlines on notice, unless, perhaps, a passenger detri-
mentally relies on expected performance.
Overhead reduction permeates every decision an airline
makes in the offering of post-deregulation services. Most air
travelers will attest readily to the reduction of in-flight services,
particularly those involving personnel. These facts, combined
with the unique constraints of providing in-flight medical care
(including the logistics of cramped passenger cabins and the as-
sumption that qualified medical personnel will coincidentally be
on board to administer prescription drugs to ill passengers) are
major challenges to the successful implementation of medical
services. These challenges are problematic because supplying
AEDs is the beginning of enhanced medical services and should
be encouraged as a means to save lives. This policy has already
received major encouragement from Congress in the form of
liability limits for air carriers. Still, if the air carriers are truly
committed to actually delivering medical care to passengers,
they must seriously consider the addition of a trained medical
professional to each flight crew to avoid overloading already
overextended flight attendants.178
of defibrillators must ensure that the devices are used and maintained properly if
they want to reduce their exposure to liability suits." Id. "At the same time, if
deploying [AEDs] does become commonplace-a situation that already may be
developing among airlines-[those who] don't make the life-saving equipment
available might find themselves subject to claims for failing to meet a new stan-
dard of care." Id.
178 One method of providing for this service in a cost effective manner would
be to quietly promote a program of free travel (or a major discount) for doctors
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One way that an airline can show its true commitment to pas-
senger health is by adding a paramedic on each flight to admin-
ister the life-saving medical supplies. There is a distinction
between the level of care and expertise that a paramedic can
offer as opposed to an Emergency Medical Technician-trained
for several hundred hours in first aid basics-or that of a flight
attendant-less equipped through similar training to deal with
many advanced life support skills.179 Having a paramedic on
board with the requisite medical supplies would eliminate the
biggest gap in an airline's attempt to administer life-saving medi-
cal care: medical expertise. In addition, the paramedic is specif-
ically trained to administer in-flight intubation, another crucial
medical service presently unavailable in-flight. Intubation is
often necessary in conjunction with defibrillation. Standing
alone, it is often needed to save lives in medical emergencies
that do not call for the AED. Intubation is a difficult medical
procedure that is further hindered by the physical constraints of
an airplane cabin. This life-saving procedure is very trouble-
some for an experienced doctor-passenger, even if the airline
supplies the proper equipment.
One last policy issue that an airline should consider when de-
ciding whether to equip airplanes with AEDs is reliance on a
defibrillator's thumbs-up reading as clearance for the continua-
tion of flights. The existing policy of emergency diversions will
still be required for all cardiac emergencies. Forgoing the ne-
cessity of diversions to seek additional medical care is not a med-
ically sound policy. Some airlines are touting this as a cost
benefit as a result of supplying AEDs. Certainly, elimination of
some emergency landings will be possible. But, the above analy-
sis counters this possibility by making it abundantly clear that
even after a successful defibrillation, emergency landings will
still be necessary for additional medical care absent full medical
capabilities on board.
who travel frequently if they: schedule flights in advance, provide credentials
that they are medically qualified, and agree to perform emergency aid if needed.
With advance notice, air carriers could fill in any schedule gaps with their own
medically qualified "floaters" for flights that would not be staffed by a volunteer
doctor. Of course, it would take some time to accumulate a database of doctor-
volunteers for such a program.
179 SeeJulie Vargo, Roadside Elf Souped-up Ambulances Are Rolling Hospitals That
Provide Emergency Care on the Spot, Ti-u. DALLAS MORNING NFWS, Jan. 26, 1998, at
3C. Paramedics are trained for almost 800 hours in basic first aid as well as in
"more sophisticated life-saving skills such as starting an IV, esophageal intubation
and suctioning, ECG recognition, defibrillation and chest decompression." Id.
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Until complete on-board medical services are provided, Good
Samaritans will continue to expose themselves to inevitable legal
challenges for their humanitarian acts. True, there is protection
in the form of the new Aviation Act, an Act that completely ex-
empts air carriers from liability.18 0 Meanwhile, AED manufac-
turers and medically-qualified emergency-care providers remain
legally vulnerable in different degrees. Still, this risk, when bal-
anced against the potential of saving lives that otherwise may be
lost, is well worth it. The issue is one of public policy: determin-
ing where to stop providing in-flight medical care once the air-
line has opened its medical bags. This line-drawing presents
difficult choices. It is clear that more than CPR is necessary be-
cause additional lives can be saved. But how far should the air-
line go before moving into the realm of med-flights?' 8 '
Taking advantage of future telemetry capabilities combined
with on-board paramedics is the most comprehensive option. If
airlines adopt this new technology as it becomes available, the
present liability issues will become moot because full medical
treatment of passengers will become a reality. 18 2 This technol-
ogy will equip airplanes with the capability to transmit an ill pas-
senger's vital statistics to a trained medical professional on the
ground, enabling the use of the complete ACLS algorithm
under the guidance of this licensed medical care professional in
tandem with full medical supplies and able assistance in the
air.18 3
At present, the best policy for an airline is to use defibrillators
on all flights, especially those over land, while continuing to di-
vert flights when the medical emergencies require immediate
follow up care-irrespective of successful defibrillation-and
provide qualified medical personnel aboard. Adopting any op-
tion that includes paramedic training yields air service that has
truly come full-circle. This circle becomes complete when a
medically trained professional accompanies all passengers as in
180 Aviation Medical Assistance Act § 5(a).
181 Issues including do-not-resuscitate orders and lack of consent are bound to
factor in even at the defibrillation level. See Amanda Christine Dake, The Applica-
tion of "Out of Hospital" Do Not Resuscitate Order Legislation To Commercial Airline
Trave 63J. AIR L. & CoM. 443 (1998).
182 See Robert Davis, High-tech Idea Equips Planes For Medical Crises, USA TODAY,
Aug. 28, 1997, at 9A. A computerized system has recently been created that "con-
nects an ailing passenger to a doctor on the ground the same way a patient in an
ambulance is monitored by a doctor waiting in an emergency room." Id.
183 See id.
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the past when only Registered Nurses were qualified to be flight
attendants.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that air carriers are performing a benevolent
function in attempting to fill a void by providing medical care to
passengers. These efforts should be encouraged. Yet, because
comprehensive treatment is not presently possible, such efforts
may come at an added expense. This is because no domestic
airline carries the requisite medical supplies or the medical per-
sonnel necessary to administer the full range of treatment neces-
sary to aid a cardiac crisis. Soon, full treatment may be possible
with the availability of both telemetry and enhanced medical
kits. At that time, the traveling public will truly be able to rely
on the benefits of in-flight medical care. But there is one caveat:
none of this will matter if there is nobody on-board with the
requisite medical training.
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